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Abstract 
Since the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union in 1983, the 
management of EU fisheries has been enormously challenging. The abundance of many fish stocks 
has declined because too much fishing capacity has been utilised on healthy fish stocks. Today, 
this decline in fish stocks has led to overcapacity in many fisheries, leading to incentives for 
overfishing. Recent research has shown that the allocation of effort among fleets can play an 
important role in mitigating overfishing when the targeting covers a range of species (multi-
species—i.e., so-called mixed fisheries), while simultaneously optimising the overall economic 
performance of the fleets. The so-called FcubEcon model, in particular, has elucidated both the 
biologically and economically optimal method for allocating catches—and thus effort—between 
fishing fleets, while ensuring that the quotas are not exceeded. Until now, the FcubEcon modelling 
approach has assumed that there is a simplified linear relationship between effort and fishing 
mortality. The present study introduces an extension of the FcubEcon model, the so-called SOMER 
model, that allows this relationship to be non-linear by linking the biological catch equation with 
the economic production function. Furthermore, the SOMER model relaxes the assumption of the 
joint production of fishing metiers, unique and separately defined sub-fleets, to allow for more 
detail regarding the flexibility to target specific groups of species. Thereby, the SOMER model 
enables the managers to assess the alternative management scenarios more accurately than the 
existing models.  
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1. Introduction 
EU fisheries management is based on single species stock assessments (Frost and Andersen, 2006; 
Vinther et al., 2004); fish stocks are assessed individually by the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which makes projections of future stock development under a range 
of assumptions about future fishing mortality. Based on these projections, Total Allowable Catches 
(TACs) are proposed and the associated socioeconomic implications of these TACs and the 
corresponding stocks are projected and evaluated by the Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries (STECF), which makes recommendations for the single species TACs. Then, 
the European Commission makes recommendations on the TACs to the Council of Ministers. Each 
year at the Council, the final TACs are agreed upon by the Ministers of the EU member states and 
divided among them through the member state “Relative Stability” principle as single species 
quotas2. These quota limitations appear to be a practical management tool, but they often have 
shortcomings in multi-species fisheries because the fleets and fishing metiers exhaust the single-
species quotas at different rates, which can lead to illegal landings, discards or the loss of fishing 
opportunities (Pascoe et al., 2007; Vinther et al., 2004). With the introduction of the 2002 reform 
of the Common Fisheries Policy, effort restrictions, in the form of capacity and sea days, have 
therefore been given more weight alongside quota control (EC, 2002). Sea-days restrictions 
combined with quota control were implemented by the European Commission in 2004 with the 
cod recovery plan in the North Sea, and they have been used as an effective way to protect 
specific species in the subsequent management plans (EC, 2010). One of the advantages of using 
limitations on sea days is that the vessels rarely have extra sea days once the main quota is filled, 
so the discards and illegal landings are reduced. A disadvantage of using the sea-days limitations is 
that catches of “healthy” stocks can be restricted more than necessary if the number of sea days is 
very low. The efficiency of the combined quota and effort control depends mainly on how 
restrictive the effort limit is (EC, 2009a) but also on the actual amount of discarding taking place.  
 
For some time, the problem of the non-optimal combination of quota and effort limitations in 
mixed fisheries has been the focus of research directed at changing the management focus from a 
single species approach to an area- and fleet-based approach that integrates the need to protect 
individual fish stocks (Hoff and Frost, 2008; Ulrich et al., 2008). Recently, the EU FP6 project 
“AFRAME” (A Framework for Fleet and Area Based Fisheries Management) focused on the 
problem and established the Fleet and Fisheries Forecast model, Fcube, which provided mixed-
fisheries management advice while still accounting for the need to protect threatened stocks 
(AFRAME, 2009; Ulrich et al., 2011). FCube is specified in such a way that assumptions (and 
settings) for simulated management decisions are based on a combination of fleet catchability and 
fish-stock preservation considerations, i.e., on biological and fleet-specific factors. Fcube, 
however, did not include the economic behaviour of the fishermen in its original form. There is, 
nevertheless, a growing recognition among decision makers and scientists that an integrated 
                                                 
2 Previously agreed percentage catch shares for each stock based on historical landings. For several stocks, the 
EU member states cannot decide on TACs themselves, but have to be in agreement with third-party countries 
such as Norway, Russia and the Faeroes. 
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approach to the management of fishing resources must focus on the biological sustainability of the 
fish resources as well as on the economic sustainability of the fishing fleets (EC, 2009b; Polasky 
and Segerson, 2009; Tschirhart, 2009). Therefore, Hoff and Frost (2008) extended the Fcube model 
with an economic module, the FcubEcon model, which bases the final distribution of effort among 
the fishing fleets and metiers on maximising the gross profit (GP) of the fleet segments and 
metiers involved, with the possibility of keeping the catches of some severely depleted species 
below the single-species quotas if required.  
 
Fcube, as well as FcubeEcon, assumes that fishing mortality (F) is related to fishing effort (E) 
through the linear relationship , where the catchability coefficient q is assumed to be 
constant. However, this relationship can be questioned from a theoretical as well as an empirical 
point of view (Coppola and Pascoe, 1998; Eide et al., 2003; Eide, 2007; Frost et al., 2009; Garza-Gil 
et al., 2003; Hannesson, 1983; van Oostenbrugge et al., 2008; Wilberg et al., 2010). Two 
implications of this relationship are 1) No crowding effect, i.e., the additional activity of one vessel 
does not affect the activity of the other vessels negatively, and therefore, there is no effect on the 
catchability; and 2) that the fishermen will choose their additional trips randomly from among the 
already existing trips instead of choosing the most profitable trip, as suggested by van 
Oostenbrugge et al. (2008). From a marginal perspective, this means that any additional effort is 
distributed equally among the historical trips. Using a non-linear relationship between effort and 
fishing mortality could be more realistic because it takes into account the possibility of crowding, 
which makes extra trips less profitable. Gillis (2003) describes crowding as a direct interference 
between vessels that reduces their efficiency, for example, when a trawler and its gear are 
blocking the way of another trawler. Furthermore, he explains that indirect interference, i.e., the 
disturbance of fish by vessels, can affect the catch per unit effort; for example, when mobile gears 
break up fish aggregations and potentially drive fish into accessible refuges. The effect of crowding 
is, furthermore, described by Rijnsdorp et al. (2000), who show that the catch rates of Dutch beam 
trawlers increased by 10% when the vessel density decreased by 25%. Additionally, van 
Oostenbrugge et al. (2008) find a decreasing catch per unit effort in the Dutch Beam trawl fishery, 
which is explained by the economic decision to skip the less profitable trip first when the effort 
becomes restrictive. Based on a Cobb-Douglas function, van Oostenbrugge et al. (2008) use the 
equation , where effort (E) is the only dependent variable to describe the catches (C) 
(stock is assumed to be exogenous and constant) and q is the catchability coefficient. Other 
authors have used a Cobb-Douglas function ( ) with catches (C) as a function of 
effort (E) and stock (S) to estimate the exponents of effort and stock, respectively (Eide et al., 
2003; Garza-Gil et al., 2003; Hannesson, 1983; Kronbak, 2005). Hannesson (1983) estimated the 
coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas function using data from the Lofoten fishery from 1950-1978 and 
found increasing returns to scale for various fleets. Garza-Gil et al. (2003) found decreasing returns 
to scale for the production factors in the Iberian hake trawl fishery (α=0.59 and β=0.24), while Eide 
et al. (2003) find evidence for the increasing returns to scale in the Norwegian bottom trawl 
fishery targeting cod. Eide et al. (2003) use catch, effort and stock data from 1971-1985, a period 
without binding quota restrictions, and for the best-performing model, the effort-catch elasticity is 
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estimated at 1.23 and the stock-catch elasticity at 0.42. Likewise, Kronbak (2005) finds increasing 
returns to scale of the total production for bottom trawlers in the Baltic Sea with α=0.75 and 
β=0.64. These papers indicate that the coefficients in a Cobb-Douglas function vary among trawler 
segments and that no general conclusions regarding returns to scale can be made. Where the 
above mentioned studies do show the existence of non-linearity between the effort (and stock) 
and the catches, the importance of using correctly specified Cobb-Douglas coefficients is still 
uncertain. This importance of correct specification will be investigated in this paper using an 
approach by Frost et al. (2009) that links the biological catch equation, relating catch to fishing 
mortality, with the economic Cobb-Douglas production function, relating catch to effort through a 
non-linear relationship. 
  
An approach that links the biological and economic production functions is useful from an 
economic as well as a biological point of view because it builds a bridge between the biological 
and the economic approaches to estimating catches. However, to date, this approach has not 
been implemented in bioeconomic management assessment models. This paper thus presents an 
extension of the FcubEcon model, the SOMER model (Simulation and Optimisation Model for 
Effort Regulation in mixed fisheries), which includes a non-linear bioeconomic relationship 
between effort and fishing mortality. 
 
Another shortcoming of the Fcube and FcubEcon models is that they both assume that all of the 
species taken by a given metier are caught together, i.e., that the vessel-metiers have joint 
production in output. The joint production technology is challenged by Thøgersen et al. (2006), 
who found that in some cases, only sub-groups of species are caught jointly, which implies that the 
species are caught non-jointly between these catch groups. More specifically, it was found that 
flatfish, Gadoids and Nephrops for Danish demersal trawlers in the North Sea suggest that there is 
non-joint production between the groups. This is taken into account in the SOMER model, which 
allows subgroups to be caught jointly within the group but non-jointly with the other subgroups. 
This extension allows for a more detailed view of the fishery and provides more refined 
management advice.  
 
This paper thus presents the multi-fleet, multi-species SOMER management model for the optimal 
allocation of effort between fleet and metiers, taking into account single species advice in quota 
managed fisheries. As discussed above, the SOMER model is an extension of the Fcube and 
FcubEcon models, with the added possibility of including a non-linear bioeconomic relationship 
between effort and fishing mortality and more refined catch compositions for the individual 
metiers. These extensions enable managers to assess the management scenarios with more 
accuracy than is provided by the existing models and to propose combined quota and effort 
management scenarios that minimise the possibility of bycatch and discard. Although the main 
purpose of this paper is to illuminate the need for models to be specified correctly, this paper also 
illustrates the effect of allowing the quota mix to be optimised; this optimisation can be obtained 
by introducing international tradable quotas. 
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2. Model description 
The models applied in the present context are based on the FcubEcon bioeconomic model (Hoff et 
al., 2010) and include an economic assessment of each fleet as well as the optimisation of effort 
allocation between fleets and fisheries as a series of scenarios. The economic assessment 
determines the economic outcomes for the fisheries given various pre-set effort allocation 
scenarios between the fleets and metiers and based on the same catch compositions as in the 
base period. The optimisation determines the effort allocation among the fleets and metiers that 
will give the highest gross profit in the fisheries one year in the future given the restriction that no 
quota, which is determined by the fish stock assessments, can be exceeded3.  
 
2.1. The simulation analysis and scenarios 
The bioeconomic model is based on a non-linear relationship between the effort (E) and the 
fishing mortality (F). From a biological point of view, TACs and catches are traditionally estimated 
using proposed fishing mortalities, thus with the Baranov equation (Lassen and Medley, 2001) in 
which F is the control variable (see the left-hand side of Equation 1). Economists, however, 
estimate catches using a production technology, often basing these estimates on effort and 
biomass as production factors. Thus, to obtain direct correspondence between the biological and 
the economic estimates of catches, this paper proposes combining the biological Baranov 
equation and the economic Cobb-Douglas production function (the right-hand side of Equation 1)4 
when establishing a link between fishing mortality and fishing effort:                                                                    
 
                                                                            (1)    
 
Therefore, Equation 1 creates a direct non-linear link between the observed fishing effort (Et) used 
to catch a specific species in year t and the estimated fishing mortality (Ft) in year t, given the 
estimated levels of stock biomass (Bt) in year t and the natural mortality (M). E0 is the effort used 
in the base period to obtain the landings L0 in that period with stock B0. The Cobb-Douglas 
coefficients α and β represent the percentage effect for landings when the effort and the stock, 
respectively, change by one percent. There are constant returns to scale when the sum of α and β 
equals one.  
 
The SOMER model assesses the management options in a multi-fleet, multi-species context. The 
starting point is therefore f=1,..., F fleets, each divided into n=1,..., N metiers, catching s=1,..., S 
species. It is furthermore assumed that the S species are caught jointly within k=1,..., K distinct 
                                                 
3 Profit maximisation may not be the only driver for the skipper, but this is the assumption of both the 
FcubeEcon and the SOMER models. 
4 The right-hand side of equation 1 is a fairly standard Cobb-Douglas production function, although the inputs 
are ratios relative to the benchmark levels E0 and B0 rather than absolute levels. 
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catch groups but that the species are caught non-jointly between the catch groups (sub-metier). In 
year t, an overall TACt,s is assigned to each species, corresponding to a target fishing mortality 
. The TACs, and thus the target fishing mortalities, are divided between fleets and metiers 
according to historical landings: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
where L0f,n,s is the historical landings of species s caught by metier n in fleet f, and L
0
s are the total 
historical landings of species s. For catch group k belonging to metier n in fleet f to catch its quota, 
a certain effort  is needed, and these efforts are evaluated using equation (1), which, after 
rearranging, can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
  
 
Here,  is the effort used by metier n in fleet f to catch the species belonging to group k in the 
base period, and  is the effort needed in year t for metier n in fleet f to catch species s 
belonging to catch group k. Thus, individual target efforts are assigned to each species within 
group k. The metier catches the species within a group jointly, using only one effort, which leads 
to the well-known problem of non-compatible efforts in multi-species fisheries managed by single 
species quotas (Hoff et al., 2010; Pascoe et al., 2007; Vinther et al., 2004). It is therefore 
interesting to show the economic outcome of the different effort choice scenarios. One scenario is 
that the fishermen always use the effort corresponding to the least binding quota for all of the 
species belonging to group k, which will result in the discard of all species except for the species 
with the maximum quota or illegal landings. Another scenario is that the fishermen only keep 
fishing until the species that has the most restrictive quota in group k, has been caught, which will 
result in a fishery without discard or illegal landings, but also a fishery in which many stocks are 
underutilised. Therefore, the final effort,   used by metier n in fleet f to catch the species 
belonging to group k is based on a function that restricts the target effort to be the same for all 
species within group k:  
 
                                                                                                                                
 
Once the final number of days at sea used by metier n in fleet f to catch group k is determined, the 
actual landings of each species by each metier are calculated using (cf. equation 3): 
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This calculation yields the final total species landings, which can be compared with the 
TACs/quotas to investigate under/over exploitation: 
 
 
 
Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate the economic consequences of the fishery once the final 
efforts and landings are determined. The landings value (revenue) for each fleet is given by the 
following equation: 
 
 
 
where  is the price of species s obtained by fleet f when the species is caught in metier n. The 
variable costs of the fishery are divided between the costs per effort unit, the costs per landed 
weight unit, and the costs per landing value.  
 
 
 
in which  is the cost per unit of effort used by fleet f to cover half of the variable costs used in 
the Data Collection Regulation (DCR) of the European Commission;  is the cost per landed kilo to 
cover the other half of the variable costs in DCR; and  is the fraction of the landing value used to 
cover the crew payments. The total gross profit (GP) taken by fleet f in year t is then given as 
follows: 
 
 
 
A restriction included in the model is that all GPt,f,n,k of segment f in metier n and catch group k 
for the assessment year t must be zero or positive. This restriction is included because an 
economically rational fisherman will not go fishing if his expected earnings will not cover his 
variable costs. The total net profit  taken by fleet f in year t is then calculated as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                              (10)  
 
in which  are the fixed costs of fleet f in year t. Both the gross profit and the net profit can be 
used as economic indicators, but the gross profit is chosen here to be the preferred indicator 
because the net profit in some segments is negative, which complicates the comparability of 
certain results. 
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2.2. The optimisation analysis and scenarios 
The optimisation scenario is similar to the simulation scenario presented above in many regards. 
The optimisation can be seen as an additional effort allocation scenario, consistent with either 
choosing the minimum, the maximum or some third function of the individual species effort, as 
described in equation (4). In the optimisation case, the effort used in each metier m by each fleet f 
to catch group k is determined by optimising the total fishery GP, which is the sum of the 
individual fleet GPs given in equation (9), under some pre-determined restrictions. This allows the 
model to illustrate the economic performance of the fleets when these are able to optimise their 
quota mix, as would be expected in an ITQ management system. This case is also interesting for 
methodological reasons because it sets the results from the minimum scenario in perspective by 
comparing them to a scenario where the quota utilisation is optimised. Where the simulation 
model assumes that the fleets have constant effort shares, the optimisation model allows the 
effort to be allocated to the fleets with higher economic performance:  
 
                                                                                                                                          (11) 
Subject to 
Various restrictions                                                                                                             
 
Using equations (5), (8) and (9), the total GP can be expressed as a (non-linear) function of the 
effort of the individual fleet, metier and groups of species via the landings and variable costs: 
 
 
 
The restrictions for the optimisations performed in this study are set such that the number of sea 
days per vessel for each catch group cannot exceed the maximum number of sea days per vessel, 
which, as a default, is set to 365 days. However, the maximum days at sea per vessel could 
potentially be lowered for technical or cultural reasons, such as bad weather conditions, 
maintenance, illness, weekends and holidays. A realistic default value is, however, difficult to set 
because the number of days at sea varies among fleets. For example, large trawlers with a large 
amount of invested capital are likely to operate on a two shift system to optimise the days at sea, 
while smaller netters are more likely to be a family business with one owner; thus, the vessel is 
likely to be utilised less. The model can easily change this assumption for each fleet segment, but 
for comparative purposes, the limit of 365 days is adequate. Another restriction in the model is 
that landings must not exceed the TACs. 
 
 
3. Data 
The model has been applied to the demersal fishery in the North Sea. The model currently 
includes nineteen demersal fleets, covering two Belgic fleets, two Dutch fleets, two Norwegian 
fleets, three English/Welsh fleets, four Scottish fleets, five Danish fleets and one fleet containing 
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other vessels, but it is possible to extend the model to allow for more segments and/or to apply 
the model in other seas. In this case study, the effort is allowed to change only for two of these 
fleets, namely the Danish otter trawlers smaller than 24 m and the Danish otter trawlers larger 
than 24 m, covering, respectively, 53 and 39 vessels. The <24 m fleet is divided into 4 metiers, 
while the >24 m fleet is divided into 5 metiers, each defined by different gears and mesh-sizes (see 
AFRAME (2009) for a further elaboration on the choice of metiers). The reason that the 
optimisation of effort is restricted to the trawler segments is that detailed information on the 
catch structure of these segments is available. Therefore, these segments are ideal for illustrating 
the new features of the model regarding non-joint production in output.  
 
The model is programmed in Microsoft Excel® from Microsoft Office 2007, and the Excel Solver 
2007 is used to run the optimisation. The inputs to the model are the fleet data, including the 
number of vessels, the catches, the catch composition and the days at sea for the relevant stocks 
and areas. Furthermore, the model includes the stock biomass estimates for the species included 
in the model, the fishing mortality, the natural mortality and the TAC. In addition, the cost and 
earnings data, including the variable costs such as fuel and maintenance, the fixed costs and the 
prices for species are required. The average cost and earnings data for 2004-2006 have been used 
as an input for the model to even out fluctuations.    
   
Fleet data, including catches, species composition and days at sea, is obtained from the database 
by DTU-Aqua, while the cost and earnings data are obtained from the 2008 Annual Economic 
Report (STECF, 2010). Eight species are included in the case study. Six of these species are subject 
to stock assessments, namely cod, haddock, plaice, pollack, sole and whiting. Furthermore, two 
Nephrops functional units5, which are subject to catches by Danish demersal trawlers, are 
included in the case study; the first is Fladen Ground, situated northwest of Scotland, and the 
second is the “other group” representing the other functional units6.  
 
The management year in the case study is 2007. The evaluations are based on the average 
biological and economic values from 2004-2006, representing the historic period. Table 1 shows 
the basic technical and economic data for the two fleets that are used in the model. The variable 
fishing costs (equation 8) include the crew payment, the sales cost, fuel, ice and provisions. The 
biological estimates of both natural mortality, fishing mortality and total stock biomass are used in 
the model. Furthermore, the total allowable catches (TACs) for the North Sea fleet and the sales 
price of fish are input parameters to the model. Table 2 gives an overview of the important 
biological and economic measures for each species.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Nephrops are limited to muddy habitats and each habitat is therefore assessed as one stock, called a 
functional unit. There are eight functional units in the North Sea (ICES, 2008). 
 
6 The fishing mortalities for Nephrops (Other) are an average of all of the other functional groups, which are 
estimated in Hoff et al. (2010). 
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Table 1: Average technical and economic vessel characteristics for the North Sea demersal fleet over the 
base period 2004-2006. 
  
Number 
of vessels 
Days at 
sea 
Gross 
tonnage 
Variable       
fishing costs  
Landings 
costs 
Crew 
costs 
Crew share             
(% of the 
      GT (€/day) (€/day) (€/day) landings value) 
Demersal trawl 12-24m 53 132 68 268 85 703 0.50 
Demersal trawl 24-40m 39 248 216 764 231 1170 0.35 
 
Table 2: Biological, price and relative catch measures for species caught by Danish demersal trawlers  
  
Fishing 
mortality 
Natural 
mortality 
Biomass 
2007 
TAC            
2007 
Sales prices 
2007 
Catch Composition                                        
(%) 
  
rate 
(average) 
rate 
(average) (1000 ton) (1000 ton) (euro/kg) 
dem. trawl                             
12-24m 
dem. trawl     
24-40m 
Cod 0.34 0.57 337 20 1.88 13.0% 12.6% 
Haddock 0.14 1.17 1,563 55 1.02 4.0% 9.9% 
Nephrops (Fladen) 2.03 0.28 5 3 7.27 1.5% 1.9% 
Nephrops (Other) n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 7.26 12.1% 13.6% 
Plaice 0.44 0.1 470 50 1.84 54.9% 22.7% 
Pollock 0.27 0.2 577 31 0.61 14.1% 37.9% 
Sole 0.36 0.1 60 15 9.46 0.3% 0.1% 
Whiting 0.28 0.51 128 24 0.61 0.2% 1.2% 
a Data for haddock, plaice, pollack, sole and whiting from ICES (2007). 
b Data for Nephrops (Fladen) and Nephrops (other) are estimated by C. Ulrich (Hoff et al., 2010). 
c The fishing mortality rate and the natural mortality rate are weighted with the stock biomass (tonnes) of 
each age group. 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The results of the case study illustrate the importance of the methodological issues presented in 
this paper. The results are thus only presented to the extent that they can contribute to the 
understanding of the consequences of (i) changing from a linear to a non-linear relationship 
between effort and fishing mortality and (ii) changing from an assumption of joint production 
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technology to an assumption of non-joint production technology. Four sub-models have been 
investigated: 
  
1. A joint fishery of all included species modelled using the traditional  linear 
relationship between fishing effort and fishing mortality (see Hoff et al. (2010) for an 
outline of the model)  
 
2. A joint fishery of all included species modelled using the non-linear relationship between 
fishing mortality and fishing effort that is outlined in equation 3.  
 
3. A non-joint fishery, divided into separate fisheries for flatfish, Gadoids and Nephrops, 
using the traditional  relationship between fishing effort and fishing mortality. 
 
4. A non-joint fishery, divided into separate fisheries for flatfish, Gadoids and Nephrops, 
using the non-linear relationship between fishing mortality and fishing effort that is 
outlined in equation 3. 
 
Sub-model 1 is the base model, i.e., the original FcubEcon model outlined in Hoff et al. (2010), 
while sub-model 4 corresponds to the entire SOMER model outlined in section 2. Sub-models 2 
and 3 represent the steps leading from sub-model 1 to sub-model 4. 
 
In each sub-model, the economically optimal allocation of effort between fleets (equation 10) has 
been evaluated in the “optimal effort allocation scenario” (OEAS). Furthermore, a “minimum 
effort allocation scenario” (MEAS) has been assessed according to equations 3 and 4, which 
evaluates the minimum effort needed to catch any of the quotas for each metier (sub-models 1 
and 2) or catch group (sub-models 3 and 4). The MEAS reflects the situation in which the 
fishermen stop fishing when the most restrictive quota of the species is reached. In reality, the 
fishermen are likely to keep fishing and to discard the species for which the quota is fully used as 
long as it is still profitable to do so (i.e., there are costs associated with discarding because fish 
must be sorted and thrown overboard). The minimum scenario should therefore be interpreted as 
a lower threshold for the short-term economic performance. Both the minimum and the optimum 
scenario ensure that no quotas are exceeded, thereby representing a fishery with no discarding. 
 
The results, presented in Table 3, show the total gross profit aggregated over the two Danish fleets 
for the minimum and optimum scenario under different model assumptions. Using a non-joint 
output production technology and a non-linear relationship between E and F provides the highest 
gross profit at approximately 11 million euros. Limiting the flexibility of the production technology 
(sub-model 2) decreases the economic performance by approximately half. This reduction occurs 
because the fishermen are able to utilise a higher percentage of the quotas when catching the 
species non-jointly. However, this reduction will not take place if the value of the increased 
catches obtained by targeting specific species groups is less than the costs of the increased 
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number of days spent at sea to catch the different species groups. This situation occurs with the 
linear models in which sub-model 3 has a lower gross profit than sub-model 1, even though sub-
model 3 has non-joint production. In general, the results show large differences depending on the 
assumptions. In particular, the degree to which the fishermen can target their catches in 
multispecies fisheries tends to play a major role in the outcome of fisheries management models 
in the North Sea when a non-linear relationship between E and F is assumed.  
 
Table 3: Economic performance for the Danish North Sea demersal trawlers under different model 
assumptions. 
  Gross profit (million euro) 
 
Sub-model 1 Sub-model 2 Sub-model 3 Sub-model 4 
Production technology joint joint non-joint non-joint  
Relationship between E and F linear non-linear linear non-linear 
Minimum scenario 3.60 5.84 2.09 11.05 
Optimum scenario 6.43 6.96 5.17 11.65 
  
Apart from the differences in the sub-models, the results show, as expected, that the optimum 
scenarios in which the sea days are allocated to maximise the gross profit have a larger gross profit 
than the more static minimum scenario in which the relative distribution of sea days is constant. 
Another observation is that the models that have a linear relationship between E and F have a 
larger difference in the gross profits between the optimum and the minimum scenario than the 
non-linear models. The reason for this difference in the gross profit is based on the underlying 
assumption that discards can be prevented by an effort control system, which means that 
fishermen will generally have a lower quota utilisation. Depending on the sub-model and scenario 
type, there will be varying amounts of “underfishing,” which is illustrated in Table 4 for the 
different species. The table shows that the linear models have an average lower quota utilisation 
than the non-linear models in the MEAS and that they therefore have a higher potential for 
improvement than the non-linear models.  
 
Table 4: Levels of quota utilisation (landings divided by the quota) for both the minimum effort allocation 
scenario (MEAS) and the optimum effort allocation scenario (OEAS) for the four sub-models. 
  Quota utilisation rate 
 
Sub-model 1 Sub-model 2 Sub-model 3 Sub-model 4 
Production technology joint joint non-joint non-joint  
Link between E and F linear non-linear linear non-linear 
Scenario type MEAS OEAS MEAS OEAS MEAS OEAS MEAS OEAS 
Cod 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Haddock 0.41 1.00 0.54 0.59 0.42 1.00 0.54 0.68 
Nephrops-Fladen 0.76 1.00 0.54 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.93 
Nephrops-Other 0.29 0.38 0.58 0.74 0.22 0.28 0.95 1.00 
Plaice 0.40 1.00 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Pollock 0.37 0.14 0.64 0.57 0.37 0.23 0.64 0.66 
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Sole 0.32 0.80 0.70 1.00 0.82 0.36 0.94 0.97 
Whiting 0.25 0.66 0.45 0.54 0.25 0.05 0.45 0.55 
Average 0.48 0.75 0.65 0.77 0.64 0.62 0.80 0.85 
 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 shows that cod is the generally the most restrictive species for the 
fishermen, which means that the quota of cod is caught before (or simultaneously with) the other 
species´ quotas. In turn, the other codfish such as haddock, pollack and whiting, which are highly 
correlated with the catch of cod, have a lower quota utilisation regardless of the production 
technology assumption. This implies that the protection of cod will cause a financial loss, not only 
because of the limited TAC of cod, but also because of the unused potential of the other codfish. 
This indirect pressure on cod is the reason that it was difficult to implement a North Sea Cod 
recovery program to begin with – and the discarding of small cod across the member state fleets 
over the past is probably the reason for cod’s delayed recovery. Plaice is another species where 
quota utilisation is high, especially in the non-joint scenarios. 
 
Apart from the observation that the non-linear models have a higher average quota utilisation 
than the linear models, it is interesting to note that the non-joint models have a higher average 
quota utilisation than the joint models and that the OEAS have a higher average utilisation than 
the MEAS. It is thus not surprising that the OEAS in model 4 has the highest quota utilisation and 
gross profit, while the MEAS in model 1 has the lowest quota utilisation and gross profit.     
 
In the results presented above, the models that have a non-linear relationship between effort and 
fishing mortality are calculated with the effort-catch coefficient (α) at 0.59 and the stock-catch 
coefficient (β) at 0.24, as estimated by Garza-Gil et al. (2003). Similar coefficient levels are used by 
Frost et al. (2009) in the EIAA7 model, which is used to make economic interpretations of the 
ACFM8 advice. However, other studies have shown increasing returns to scale (Eide et al., 2003; 
Kronbak, 2005). Due to these differences, sensitivity analyses are performed to determine the 
robustness of the results using different α and  coefficients in the non-linear models. The α-
coefficients are set to 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1, while only three different values for the  
coefficients are presented (0.2, 0.6, and 1) for the sake of simplicity and a clearer overview. The 
estimates of gross profit based on the sensitivity test (coefficients set as listed above) are 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Economic Interpretation of ACFM Advice 
8 ACFM is the Advisory Committee on Fishery Management 
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Figure 1: Gross profit in million euros as a function of the effort-catch coefficient (α) for different stock-catch 
coefficients ( ). The relationship is shown for the minimum effort allocation scenarios (to the left) and the 
optimum effort allocation scenarios (to the right) for both the joint production models (upper part) and the 
non-joint production models (lower part). It should be noted that the joint production models have a 
different scale than the non-joint production models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between the gross profit and the coefficient values is shown for the joint and the 
non-joint production technologies, respectively, and for both the minimum and the optimum 
scenarios, respectively (Figure 1). The gross profit for the minimum scenarios steadily decreases 
for increasing α and β. This decrease occurs because larger α and β increase the effect of the 
landings for all 0<α<1 and 0<β<1; see equation 5. Because valuable stocks have decreased 
compared to the base period, the gross profit will also decrease with a larger β. Likewise, the 
effort is lower in the minimum model because the fishermen are not allowed to overfish any 
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species, which results in a decreasing profit with a larger α. The same trend is observed in the 
optimum scenarios, which can also be shown analytically; see equation (11). However, when 
α>0.4-0.6 (the exact inflection point depends on the value of β), the gross profit increases with 
increasing α because the quotas are better utilised by being reallocated between metiers. The 
value of the increasing landings thus exceeds the costs of the extra sea days.  
 
The upper part of Figure 1 shows the cases in which there is joint production in output. Comparing 
the optimum scenario (right) with the minimum scenario (left), shows that the optimum scenario 
produces marginally higher gross profits than the minimum scenario. The lower part of Figure 1 
represents the non-joint fishery in which the species groups flatfish, Gadoids and Nephrops are 
caught in a separate metier. Additionally, in the non-joint case, the optimum scenario gives a 
higher gross profit. Comparing the “upper” joint sub-models with the “lower” non-joint models 
reveals that relaxing the strong assumption of joint production increases the gross profit by 
between 26% (α=β=0.2) and 203% (α=β=1). It should be noted that the increasing gross profit of 
26% assumes decreasing returns to scale (α+β=0.4), whereas the increasing gross profit of 203% 
assumes increasing returns to scale (α+β=2). The main reason for increased gross profit by 
assuming non-joint production in outputs is the inclusion of increased catch flexibility, which 
makes it possible to utilise a larger proportion of the quotas.  
 
To summarise, the results indicate that when simulated fishing in a model is based on assumptions 
that effort can be shifted, then the earnings will increase, compared to the case of a joint fishery. 
Furthermore, the results clearly indicate the importance of including detailed information on the 
catch flexibility in bioeconomic models because the absence of this information can lead to 
models that bias the results of the assessment. The results, furthermore, show that the optimum 
scenarios yield higher gross profits than the minimum scenarios. This indicates that a thoroughly 
considered effort allocation scheme can have a positive impact on the earnings of the fishermen. 
The optimum scenario thus represents a “room for improvement” scenario. 
 
An interesting analysis is to compare the modelling results to the performance of the 2 fleets in 
the base period, which is estimated to be 6.21 million euros based on the historical data in 2004-
2006. It is clear that the most flexible scenario 4, representing both the “non-joint” and “non-
linearity” assumptions, overestimates the actual performance of the fleet (both the MEAS as well 
as the OEAS). The actual performance is more in line with the performance modelled in scenario 2, 
which is based on a joint production function and a non-linear relationship between effort and 
fishing mortality. Here, the historical performance is between the MEAS (5.84 million euro) and 
the OEAS (6.96 million euros). This indicates that managers should use a non-linear model but 
assume joint production. Taking this as a starting point in a fishery restricted by quotas, the 
introduction of effort restrictions will prevent fishermen from discarding, and their gross profit will 
be reduced to 5.84 million euros, as in the MEAS. Then, effort allocation between fleets will be 
allowed in the OEAS, and the gross profit will increase to 6.98 million euros. 
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The model presented in this paper builds on an underlying assumption of constant landings 
composition, which is based on the landings composition from the base period. The model 
assumes that the fishermen have not been distorting their optimal fishing patterns in the base 
period, i.e., that there are no quota-derived discards in the base period. This assumption is crucial 
because if the fishermen have been discarding in the base period, due to a lack of consistency 
between the available quotas and the catch composition, a bias in the catchability used in the 
model will result. The magnitude of the problem depends on the amount of discard of over-quota 
species. Estimates of discards for otter trawl in the North Sea are presented by Catchpole et al. 
(2005). The estimated discard for the Nephrops otter trawlers fishery constitutes between 45% 
and 59% of the landings, while the numbers are 20-48% for cod, 30-41% for haddock and 51-65% 
for whiting for the roundfish otter trawl fishery. While these measures might appear to be large, 
the figures constitute both the discard of undersized fish and the quota-derived discard, and a 
survey of the UK roundfish trawl fisheries in the North Sea indicate that a major part of the 
discards are undersized species (98% of cod, 87% of haddock and 97% of whiting) (Cappell, 2001). 
This indicates that the problem of whether the model reflects the true catch composition in the 
base year is relatively small. 
 
The low level of quota-derived discards suggests that the fishermen choose to truncate their trip 
and return to port as soon as a quota is fully utilised. Another possibility is that the fishermen are 
non-compliant to the quotas and therefore land the marketable fish illegally (Cappell, 2001). The 
former is assumed in this paper and implies that there is no discard of quota species except for the 
catch of undersized fish. This scenario is likely if the managers impose a combination of quota and 
effort restrictions on the fishermen and the SOMER model can assist the manager to set the effort 
limits according to the quotas. In comparison, in management regimes where quotas are the main 
form for regulation, the fishermen with pure profit maximising behaviour would choose to discard 
the fully utilised quota species and land the other quota species as long as it is still profitable to do 
so. Fishermen that are financially constrained and/or able to justify their actions might even land 
the fish without the available quota (illegally). The possibilities of purchasing/leasing extra quotas 
or rolling over the quota to the following year are other ways to reduce the over-quota discards in 
the absence of effort restrictions. 
 
The SOMER model is an important tool within EU fisheries management, where a complex mix of 
input and output controls are in place. This mix of management instruments makes it unclear 
which instruments are the limiting factors to fishing mortality in the complex of multi-fleet and 
multi-species fisheries. The use of both effort and quota limitations could lead the fishermen to 
take undesirable actions if the quota and effort restrictions are not carefully adjusted, each 
considering the other. For example, a fisherman may want to fish at a more distant fishing location 
at the end of the season with the expectation of catching the right mix of species to match the 
quotas. However, the fisherman is short on effort days and his only option is therefore to fish 
close to shore with, consequently, a large over-quota discard or the possible loss in income. These 
unfortunate situations could occur given combined quota and effort restriction management and 
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could result in reducing the trust of the fishermen in the management regimes. It is therefore 
important that the quota and effort limitations are matched to create consistent pressure on 
fishing mortality, which is complicated by the setting of multiple fleets that catch multiple species 
and is subject to fluctuations in stock abundances over time. It is therefore important for 
managers to use multi-fleet, multi-species management assessment models such as SOMER that 
can provide advice on these matters. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, it has been suggested by scientists, biologists and economists 
that there is a non-linear relationship between effort and fishing mortality in bioeconomic models. 
The effort-catch coefficients in the empirical studies range from 0.59-1.23. The estimates of the 
stock-catch coefficient were all below 1, ranging from 0.24-0.89, depending on the study. These 
estimates can be interpreted as indicating that the density of the stocks at the fishing ground 
increases by less than 1% when the total stock biomass increases by 1% (A. Eide et al., 2003). This 
is consistent with the empirical studies. Crecco and Overholtz (1990) found that the population of 
Georges Bank haddock appeared to aggregate at low levels of biomass and disperse at high levels 
of biomass. The same pattern is found for cod (Swain and Sinclair, 1994), while plaice and flounder 
do not have any significant distributional differences at the different levels of biomass in Kattegat 
and Skagerak (Casini et al., 2005). Another interpretation of the less than proportional increase in 
catch with increasing stock could be that the actual trawling time is only a fraction of the time 
spent at sea. Thus, if the Cobb-Douglas estimates are based on the total trip effort instead of only 
the trawling hours, these would, all other things being equal, be expected to provide a lower 
stock-catch coefficient. The large differences in economic performances with the changing effort-
catch and stock-catch elasticities found in this study emphasise the importance of choosing these 
values correctly in management studies. More empirical studies are therefore needed to 
illuminate these issues. 
 
Both the MEAS and the OEAS assume that the fishermen will avoid discarding if an effort control 
system is established. This assumption implies that the fishermen will not fully utilise all of their 
quotas and that most stocks will therefore be expected to increase. In the long term, this increase 
implies that the catchability will increase9, which could improve the economic performance in the 
future. The expected increase in stocks is therefore important to address so that the managers can 
weigh the social benefits and costs of potential management decisions. However, in this case 
study covering only 2 fleets in the North Sea, the absolute change in stocks is marginal and is not 
presented. 
  
The assumption of no discard in the MEAS and the OEAS raises the question of whether the 
fishermen have incentives to avoid discard. Here, an issue is that the number of vessels is held 
                                                 
9 In most cases, the catchability will increase when the stock abundance increases. However, there are 
exceptions to this rule, for example, clupeids with schooling behaviour. With such species, the catchability is 
found to increase when the stock abundance decreases as a result of a smaller habitat size that makes it easier 
to find the schools (Arreguín-Sánchez, 1996). 
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constant in the SOMER model (sub-model 4), which means that the optimal number of sea days 
per vessel is 52 and 89 for the small and large Danish North Sea demersal trawlers, respectively. 
Because the maximum days at sea for a demersal trawler is much higher than these values, the 
capacity of the fleets is underutilised and thereby inefficient. A capacity underutilised fleet will 
have a high incentive to fish more than permitted, thus leading to a violation of the quotas and, in 
the long run, to stock depletion. It will be interesting to address this issue by extending the SOMER 
model to allow the amount of vessels in the fleet to vary. This extension would increase the 
utilisation of the fleet capacity and thereby the efficiency of each vessel. This type of extension will 
reflect an ITQ system, where the highly efficient vessels will buy the quotas from the less efficient 
vessels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Management based on effort and capacity control relies heavily on a detailed understanding of 
the relationship between these factors and the fishing mortality if a successful outcome is to be 
obtained. In the present context, the SOMER model is developed and used to analyse two 
scenarios about how to allocate effort between fleets while continuing to maintain sustainable 
fisheries by limiting the total catches of the overexploited (threatened) species in the fleet’s catch 
compositions. The minimum scenario is appropriate for short-run assessments of a non-discard 
fishery because it assumes that fishing vessels have the same fishing pattern as in previous years. 
The optimum scenario, however, is a long-run scenario in which vessels are able to shift into other 
fisheries where more profits are obtained but still under the constraint that no quotas are 
exceeded. The transition period towards an economically “optimal” fishery depends on the costs 
of reallocating the vessel, the degree of uncertainty in shifting to another fishery, the possible lack 
of skills to manage the new fishery and the assessments of the future stock- and price 
developments.  
 
One strength of the SOMER model is that it creates consistency between the biological and 
economic approaches to estimating catch. This consistency is secured through the non-linear 
relationship between effort and fishing mortality rate, the form of which is introduced in this 
paper. Another strength of the model is that it allows different types of fishing patterns to be 
compared, i.e. the model can compare jointness in production with non-jointness. This allows the 
manager to use in-depth knowledge of a specific fishery to obtain more accurate measures of 
economic fleet performances, given specific management plans, or to use the range of results as a 
sensitivity analysis if no prior assumptions can be made. The model is useful for managers who 
wish to combine effort and quota regulation because it can provide a comparative estimate of the 
costs of different conservation policies. 
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